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NOTES
THE NONSOLIDNESS OF SOLIDARITY
Plaintiff's child was struck by a car driven by defendant, a
minor. In the original suit between plaintiff and defendant's father,
the defendant was found free of negligence and the case dismissed.
While that suit was pending on application for certiorari to the su-
preme court, defendant reached majority, and plaintiff initiated
against him a second suit based on the same facts. Defendant ex-
cepted to the suit on the basis of prescription,' and the court main-
tained this exception over plaintiff's contention that defendant and
his father were debtors in solido and that plaintiff's first suit had
therefore interrupted prescription. In affirming the dismissal, the
supreme court held that the father was not solidary codebtor with his
minor son for the son's alleged tortious conduct, and that conse-
quently, bringing suit against the father did not interrupt prescrip-
tion against the son. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972).
The concept of solidary obligations originates in Civil Code arti-
cle 2091 which states that
[tihere is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when
they are all obliged to the same thing, so that each may be com-
pelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made by one
of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.2
This definition of solidary obligations consists of three elements:
multiple debtors; liability of each for the whole debt; and release of
all by one's payment. The logical import of this article is that any
obligation containing these three elements should be an obligation in
solido. However, this broad definition is significantly limited by arti-
cle 2093:1 which declares that solidarity cannot be presumed: it must
be either expressly stipulated or provided by law. Consequently, soli-
darity can occur in only two situations: where the parties themselves
have indicated either by use of the term in solido or otherwise that
the obligation contains the required three elements; or where the law
1. Defendant also raised exceptions of res judicata, improper division of a cause
of action and a plea of collateral estoppel, but the trial court and court of appeal
maintained only the pleas of prescription. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 304
(La. 1972).
2. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2091.
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2093: "An obligation in solido is not presumed; it must be
expressly stipulated.
"This rule ceases to prevail only in cases where an obligation in solido takes place
of right by virtue of some provisions of the law."
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provides that these elements exist relative to an obligation. These
requisite elements of solidarity should be distinguished from other
characteristics described in articles 2091 through 2107, which do not
help to identify an obligation as solidary or not, but rather determine
the legal effects of solidarity.
Most of the characteristics or legal effects of solidarity are based
on the notion that codebtors in solido are mandataries of one an-
other.4 Solidary codebtors can be bound either directly or condition-
ally, depending upon the terms of the agreement or the provision of
law. 5 For example, a man may obligate himself solidarily as surety
for his codebtor on the condition that his liability not arise until
payment first be demanded from the principal debtor and not re-
ceived. Another characteristic resulting from this mutual mandatary
relationship is that suit against one debtor interrupts prescription for
his codebtors, as well as serves to put all the codebtors in default.'
Furthermore, even though the creditor may demand the whole debt
from any of the debtors,8 that debtor retains the right of contribution
against his codebtors. Therefore, unless the debt is principally his
concern,' he can force his codebtors to reimburse him for their virile
portion of the debt.'0
The issue in the instant case centered upon identifying the na-
ture of the father and son's obligation in order to determine whether
the legal effect of solidarity concerning interruption of prescription
applied to the situation. The determination reached by the court was
that the dual liability of the father and son" was not solidary and that
prescription of the suit against the son was not interrupted by the
original suit against the father. However, in reaching this decision,
the court seems to have confused some of the legal effects of solidarity
with its requisite elements, thereby basing its decision essentially on
the inverse argument that, "[tihe legal consequences attaching to
solidary obligations properly-so-called do not necessarily extend to
the legal responsibilities of the father for the torts of his minor
child." I
4. 4 MARCADE, EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL n' 5 9 2 , at 490.
(7eme ed., 1873).
5. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2092; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3045.
6. Id. art. 2097.
7. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1912, 2046, 2047, 2096.
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2094.
9. Id. art. 2106.
10. Id. art. 2104.
11. The law holds both the minor and his father liable for the minor's offenses and
quasi-offenses. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 237, 2227, 2315 and 2318.
12. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307 (La. 1972).
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One of the legal consequences of the father's liability under arti-
cle 2318's found by the court to be inconsistent with the nature of
solidarity concerned article 3552' 4 which provides that acknowledge-
ment of a debt by one debtor in solido interrupts prescription against
the debt for his codebtors.' 5 The court determined in this case that
the minor's admission of fault would not constitute acknowledgement
serving to interrupt prescription, basing its decision primarily on a
1948 case, Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co.,'" which held that a master
is not solidarily liable with his servant for the latter's torts. Even
though Cox in no way involved the liability of the parent and child,
the court in that case analogized the master's liability to that of the
father and found them both.not solidary on the basis that solidarity
was not expressly stipulated as required by article 2093. Regardless
of whether this characteristic is applicable," the court's reverse rea-
soning is evident: it attempted to identify the obligation according
to its legal effects when in actuality the legal consequences of an
obligation can properly be determined only after the obligation is
identified.
Another argument advanced by the court was that the son could
not avail himself of the advantages of debtors in solido granted by
article 2103,'1 which ordinarily extends to a debtor having satisfied a
debt in solido the right to force his codebtors to contribute their virile
portions, even to the extent of making them third party defendants
in a suit on the debt by the creditor:
[I]t is plain that a minor son who discharges a debt created by
his own independent tortious conduct cannot claim contribution
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318: "The father, or after his decease, the mother, are
responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children,
residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to
them recourse against those persons. The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of
minors."
14. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3552: "A citation served upon one debtor in solido, or his
acknowledgment of the debt, interrupts prescription with regard to all the others and
even to their heirs."
15. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. 1972).
16. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
17. The court in Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 59, 34 So. 2d 373,
375 (1948), gave no basis for its decision that article 3552 was inapplicable to the dual
obligation of parent and child for the child's torts, and even suggested that the article
might apply only to contractual obligations.
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103: "When two or more debtors are liable in solido,
whether the obligation arises from a contract, a quasi-contract, an offense, or a quasi-
offense, it should be divided between them. As between the solidary debtors, each is
liable only for his virile portion of the obligation." (Emphasis added).
[Vol. 34
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from his father, who had no part in the tortious action but who
is nevertheless responsible under Article 2318.11
The court's observation is certainly correct, but the unavailability of
contribution is not, in this case, inconsistent with the nature of soli-
darity. Though the right of contribution is generally available to co-
debtors in solido, article 2106 notes an exception to this rule:
If the affair for which the debt has been contracted in solido,
concern only one of the co6bligors in solido, that one is liable for
the whole debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to
him, are considered only as securities. 0
Instead of the reverse reasoning applied by the court, a more
pertinent consideration would seem to be whether the father's liabil-
ity under article 2318 contained the requisite elements of solidarity
prescribed in articles 2091 and 2093. Since the law holds both the
father and minor son liable for the son's torts, the first three elements
given in article 2091 are easily evident,2 and not discussed by the
court. However, the other requirement, that solidarity not be pre-
sumed unless provided by law, is more questionable, and the court
did attempt to determine whether it was present in this case.
The court's analysis of this requirement began with its initial
observation that solidarity must be created by either contract, testa-
ment or operation of law, and that since the paternal relationship
involves neither contract nor testament, the solidarity, if it existed,
must have been established by law." The court then determined that
even where the elements of solidarity are established by law, article
2093 requires that solidarity be expressly stipulated in the particular
provision assigning liability. Therefore, since article 2318 which pro-
vides legal basis for the father's liability does not indicate solidarity,
his liability cannot be deemed in solido.
The disquieting effect of the court's decision is that it has found
a situation where the law clearly indicates that two different persons
are equally and independently responsible for the same debt, and
where payment by one would exonerate the other, but has found the
obligation thereby created not to be in solido because no statute
expressly stipulates its solidarity as provided in article 2093. How-
ever, the court's interpretation of article 2093, as applicable to a
19. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307 (La. 1972).
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106.
21. Multiple debtors, responsibility of each debtor for the whole debt and exonera-
tion for all debtors upon payment by one.
22. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 305 (La. 1972).
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situation like the instant case where solidary liability is provided by
law, seems inconsistent with both grammatical construction and tra-
ditional interpretation. The article first states the rule that an obliga-
tion in solido cannot be presumed and that it must be expressly
stipulated; then the second paragraph notes an exception when the
solidarity takes place by some provision of law. Certainly an obvious
construction of this article, if not the most apparent, is that the entire
rule of the first paragraph is inapplicable when solidarity results from
provision of law rather than by contract, and that consequently no
express stipulation of solidarity is necessary in such cases. Therefore,
where the law expressly requires that several persons be equally and
independently liable for one debt and provides as well that if one pays
the debt, the others are exonerated, then solidarity is provided by law
and the rule of express stipulation "ceases to prevail." 3 Furthermore,
this latter construction has been given article 1202 of the French Civil
Code, of which our article 2093 is a virtually verbatim translation, by
both legal commentators and the courts.
The legal responsibility which may be imposed on several persons
jointly is in solidum only in cases expressly or impliedly provided
by law.
The first paragraph of Article 1202 dealing with conventional
solidarity, requires that it be expressly stipulated. But it is other-
wise with regard to the second paragraph of the same article
which, dealing with legal solidarity, admits it in all cases where
it results from a provision of law, without requiring an express
declaration.2
Planiol also recognizes this broader construction for legal solidarity,
not only in the article itself, but also in the application given it by
the courts:
It is precisely because it is possible to attach several legal solu-
tions to a number of primary principles that the courts have been
able to give a very broad extension to the area of passive solidar-
ity, in spite of the rule of article 1202: they have used in a most
forceful fashion, the argument of analogue, and have admitted
solidarity, because in an analogous situation, it had been estab-
lished by law. 21
23. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2093.
24. 4 AUBREY AND RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n°298b (La. St. L. Inst.
transl., 1971).
25. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL n°1856 (12erne ed., 1952).
(Translated by the author.)
[Vol. 34
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Not only does this construction of article 2093 appear sounder doc-
trinally than the court's interpretation, but it also eliminates the
inconsistency with the Code's definition of solidarity that plagues the
court's analysis.
As ably pointed out and discussed by Justice Tate in his concur-
ring opinion,2" the court's decision is "probably correct for the wrong
reasons, "2 7 resulting primarily from the hard facts of the case. In spite
of the obviously fair result, however, the decision has misconstrued a
principle in the doctrine of solidarity so as to further complicate the
use and understanding of the concept in our law. As Justice Tate
predicted,28 the results of this complication have rapidly appeared as
courts have tried to apply the principles as interpreted by the su-
preme court in Wooten. For example, in the recent Third Circuit
case, Tabb v. Norred,29 plaintiff attempted to argue on the basis of
Wooten that if the defendant father and son were not solidarily liable
for the tort committed by the son, then the father was not entitled
to enforce contribution from the son's joint tortfeasor, and thereby
reduce his liability to one-half the total damages awarded. In spite
of this logical extension of the Wooten holding, the court rejected the
plaintiff's contention and attempted to describe the parent's liability
for a child's torts:
We believe Article 2318 of the Civil Code imposes liability on the
father for the full amount of the damage occasioned by his minor
child. The child, of course, is also liable for the full amount of
such damages. Either the father or the child may be compelled
to pay the whole debt, we think, and payment by one will exoner-
ate the other.3 0
This description of the parent's liability under article 2318 from
Tabb appears to parallel precisely the definition of obligations in
solido in article 2091, in spite of the express holding in Wooten that
such liability is not solidary. As confusing as the doctrine of solidarity
is to Louisiana practitioners, it is unfortunate that the court has
increased that confusion by adding the inconsistency of its rule in the
instant case, that not all obligations conforming to the Code's defini-
tion of debts in solido in articles 2082 and 2091 are actually solidary,
26. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 307 (La. 1973) (concurring opinion).
27. Id. at 310.
28. Id. at 311.
29. 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 232.
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and that to those multiple obligations mentioned in article 20771'
must be added another type as yet unnamed.
Carolyn Hazel
THE PARTNER AS A THIRD PARTY TORTFEASOR: LIABILITY OR IMMUNITY
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Under the Louisiana workmen's compensation law, the employer
is afforded immunity from suit brought by an injured employee.' In
cases where the injury is caused by a third party tortfeasor who is not
the employer, however, recovery from the employer or his insurer does
not preclude suit by the injured employee against the third party.'
Thus, a plaintiff seeking recovery in workmen's compensation is en-
couraged to have his tortfeasor judicially recognized as a "third
party."3 Various problems may arise, however, when "third party
31. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2077: "Where there are more than one obligor or obligee
named in the same contract, the obligation it may produce may be either several or
joint or in solido, both as regards the obligor and the obligee."
1. "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on
account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chap-
ter shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents, or relations." LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950). See also Comment,
33 LA. L. REV. 325 (1973).
2. "When an injury for which compensation is payable under this Chapter has
been sustained under circumstances creating in some person (in this Section referred
to as third person) other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect
thereto, the injured employee or his dependent may claim compensation under this
Chapter and the payment or award of compensation hereunder shall not affect the
claim or right of action of the injured employee or his dependent against such third
person, . . . and such injured employee or his dependent may obtain damages from
or proceed at law against such third person to recover damages for the injury." LA. R.S.
23:1101 (1950).
3. Assuming plaintiffs only recourse for injuries is workmen's compensation, his
potential for recovery is severely limited by statute. For example, the maximum com-
pensation allowed is $65.00 per week for a period of 500 weeks if the injury causes death
or permanent disability. LA. R.S. 23:1202 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No.
71; LA. R.S. 23:1221 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess. No. 25 § 5; LA.
R.S. 23:1231 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess. No. 25 § 6.
Medical expenses are generally limited to $12,500.00. LA. R.S. 23:1203 (1950), as
amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 322 § 1; 1956, No. 282 § 1; 1968, No. 103 § 1.
On the other hand, if plaintiff is successful in arguing that his tortfeasor is a third
party not his employer, he may recover both workmen's compensation from his em-
ployer, and he may additionally recover an amount virtually unlimited in tort from
his tortfeasor. ("[Tlhe payment or award of compensation hereunder shall not .. .
